"mass society" may result;3 (2) these groups become sufficiently powerful to demand autonomy as modernization proceeds; and (3) in modern society they are people's primary channel of political activity. This article provides evidence from contemporary Egypt against each of these assumptions. More generally, the argument is that Egypt typifies the "unincorporated society," that is, one in which organized groups are and have always been relatively weak and unimportant. There was neither church nor medieval corporation, the two sources of pluralism-and, dialectically, totalitarianism-in the West. Although Islam and subsequently nationalism acquired legitimacy in Egypt, they were never embodied in strong autonomous organizations.
The background of the "unincorporated" society explains, in turn, why the authoritarian syndrome is so durable in the face of modernization. No ideological vanguard is possible, yet none is needed to sustain a system of concentrated and expanded power. Our original proposition should be confined to societies that have a corporate tradition-Christian Europe and its offshoots in Latin America, for example. There seem to be basic differences between authoritarian political processes in corporate and in unincorporated societies which we shall attempt to sketch briefly in conclusion.
Egypt as Authoritarian and Modernizing Regime
Egypt falls within the range of cases to which our original proposition is intended to apply, in that its regime is authoritarian and its society has reached a level of modernization at which organized groups might be expected to pose political problems. It is authoritarian ip the sense that the late Gamal Abdul Nasser and a handful of close collaborators and followers have controlled the state bureaucracy since 1954, when they ousted General Mohammed Naguib. They insulated the country from any competing power center, either inside or outside.4 Nasser's agrarian reform, launched within weeks of the original coup of July 1952, appropriated the socioeconomic base of the old elite's political power. The socialist decrees of 1961, which nationalized all major industry and extended the agrarian reform, 3 See William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society (Princeton, 1959), and Oscar Handlin, The Uprooted (New York, 1949). 4 Technically, what most distinguishes an authoritarian from a pluralist or totalitarian regime is the relative autonomy of the state. In a totalitarian system the party controls the state, while in a pluralist system groups working through the political institutions are expected to control the bureaucracy. In the authoritarian system the state-in the sense of leader or junta plus bureaucracy-is relatively autonomous (though of course the bureaucracy per se is not).
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Egypt as Authoritarian and Modernizing Regime
Egypt falls within the range of cases to which our original proposition is intended to apply, in that its regime is authoritarian and its society has reached a level of modernization at which organized groups might be expected to pose political problems. It is authoritarian ip the sense that the late Gamal Abdul Nasser and a handful of close collaborators and followers have controlled the state bureaucracy since 1954, when they ousted General Mohammed Naguib. They insulated the country from any competing power center, either inside or outside.4 Nasser's agrarian reform, launched within weeks of the original coup of July 1952, appropriated the socioeconomic base of the old elite's political power. The socialist decrees of 1961, which nationalized all major industry and extended the agrarian reform, destroyed most remaining private resources that might have been used to challenge the government.
Nasser took measures, moreover, to prevent any bureaucratic challenges to his personal control. Initial purges primarily affected the army and the Ministry of the Interior. Technical ministries, such as public works, managed to avoid any extensive changes in personnel. He made certain, however, that men personally loyal to him, usually officers or army engineers, occupied key posts within the ministries. Eventually the position of permanent undersecretary was abolished, so that top administrative posts tended to be awarded increasingly on political grounds. By reshuffling ministers periodically, Nasser ensured that no "center of power" within the bureaucracy might develop autonomy vis-a-vis the president. The one possible exception was the army, ruled somewhat independently by his close friend and vice-president, Marshal Abdal Hakim Amer.5
Egypt is also authoritarian in the negative sense of being unable to develop the ideology and organization needed to absorb and atomize social groupings. There is an official ideology, of course, embodied in the National Charter of 1962, designed to justify the nationalization of the bulk of Egyptian industry the previous year. But the doctrinal elements do not seem systematically related to any explicit set of social and political principles.6 Moreover, "Arab Socialism" stresses harmony rather than conflict and hence offers no practical means of distinguishing saints from sinners, vanguard from reactionaries. Indeed, ideas do not seem to constitute a significant source of inspiration or of cleavage within the political elite. Ali Sabry and Zakariah Mohieddine, respectively, represented the ideologies of Moscow and Washington by circumstance, not conviction. Even on 
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Egypt is also authoritarian in the negative sense of being unable to develop the ideology and organization needed to absorb and atomize social groupings. There is an official ideology, of course, embodied in the National Charter of 1962, designed to justify the nationalization of the bulk of Egyptian industry the previous year. But the doctrinal elements do not seem systematically related to any explicit set of social and political principles.6 Moreover, "Arab Socialism" stresses harmony rather than conflict and hence offers no practical means of distinguishing saints from sinners, vanguard from reactionaries. Indeed, ideas do not seem to constitute a significant source of inspiration or of cleavage within the political elite. Ali Sabry and Zakariah Mohieddine, respectively, represented the ideologies of Moscow and Washington by circumstance, not conviction. Even on In this ideological vacuum, obviously no vanguard party, much less gleichschaultung or totalitarian "breakthrough" was possible. The political organization, whether Liberation Rally, founded in 1953, National Union, founded in 1958, or Arab Socialist Union, founded in 1962, was never the principal source of political recruitment. R. Hrair Dekmejian's data on the 131 Egyptian ministers who held office between 1952 and 1968 provide spectacular documentation for this: only two had positions in the political organization before becoming minister, while at least 83 held a party position either during or after their terms as minister.7 Hardly a vanguard for recruiting top political leadership, the party was more like a rearguard for retiring it.
Yet, on the face of it, Egypt would appear to have been socially mobilized to such an extent by the late 1950s as to require a vanguard in order for modernization "from above" to proceed. My assessment is admittedly tentative because I know of no work which specifies the thresholds in social mobilization indicators for which our propositions about groups are supposed to apply. But it is possible to compare Egypt with other countries which have experienced within the past two decades the dilemma of authoritarian regimes discussed above. Somewhat arbitrarily, I have selected a mixture of authoritarian systems that displayed varying degrees of success or failure in developing a vanguard party or stagnating. Table 1 compares these systems to Egypt with respect to the conventional social mobilization indicators of GNP per capita, urbanization, nonagricultural employment, university enrollment, and mass media exposure.
Even in 1959-60, Egypt was as socially mobilized as most of these countries (in the years for which data are available), except with respect to per capita income and mass media exposure. In the following decade radio and television made great leaps forward; indeed, Table 1 indicates that Egypt continued to modernize rapidly in the 1960s on most dimensions except newspaper circulation. The comparisons suggest that Egypt has at least reached sufficient levels of modernity to make our case study relevant, though diachronic data would be needed to compare regime performances over time.
A further comparison with Portugal, Brazil, and Spain is instructive. Each has exemplified authoritarianism in a Latin, Catholic context (i.e., corporate society). Yet, on the face of it, Egypt would appear to have been socially mobilized to such an extent by the late 1950s as to require a vanguard in order for modernization "from above" to proceed. My assessment is admittedly tentative because I know of no work which specifies the thresholds in social mobilization indicators for which our propositions about groups are supposed to apply. But it is possible to compare Egypt with other countries which have experienced within the past two decades the dilemma of authoritarian regimes discussed above. Somewhat arbitrarily, I have selected a mixture of authoritarian systems that displayed varying degrees of success or failure in developing a vanguard party or stagnating. Table 1 compares these systems to Egypt with respect to the conventional social mobilization indicators of GNP per capita, urbanization, nonagricultural employment, university enrollment, and mass media exposure.
A further comparison with Portugal, Brazil, and Spain is instructive. Each has exemplified authoritarianism in a Latin, Catholic context (i.e., corporate society). Table 2 shows that the Nasser government expanded power, as measured by the proportion of total and crime rates low.9 The last major public sign of anomie occurred on January 26, 1952, when mobs, for the most part disorganized, burned down some 700 buildings in the modern downtown section in protest against British reprisals for Egyptian commando raids on Suez Canal Zone bases.l0 After Nasser came to power, there were occasional student and worker demonstrations, notably in 1968 and, after his death, in 1972, but no mass rioting."l Leonard Binder has suggested that the thesis of social breakdown has the greatest relevance for the "upper-lower" classes-factory labor, semiskilled workers, and retail and service employees. Still, he concludes, "Egypt is not yet so modernized as to be able to suffer problems of a psycho-social nature to become matters of public concern."12 Obviously by defining modernization in this way he is making the assumption I am questioning.
The available data on groups are scanty and not entirely conclusive. It is not possible for resident American, or even Egyptian, political scientists to study the official political organization in depth in order to measure the extent of real participation of its five to six million paper members. The Arab Socialist Union (ASU) groups virtually all adult males, while trade unions and agricultural cooperatives have substantially increased their membership under Nasser's encouragement. These official organizations do not seem to integrate many people, at least not in Cairo, however, to judge from the way they are parodied even in the mass media. 
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The available data on groups are scanty and not entirely conclusive. It is not possible for resident American, or even Egyptian, political scientists to study the official political organization in depth in order to measure the extent of real participation of its five to six million paper members. The Arab Socialist Union (ASU) groups virtually all adult males, while trade unions and agricultural cooperatives have substantially increased their membership under Nasser's encouragement. These official organizations do not seem to integrate many people, at least not in Cairo, however, to judge from the way they are parodied even in the mass media. higher authorities, some of whom had been eliminated by Sadat's purge.
Membership in voluntary associations is often helpful to political careers in Egypt, whether at the provincial, local, or national level-so much so that one aspiring parliamentary candidate joined some thirty-eight of them, hoping his dues could buy useful contacts. There is, however, another, more public function that societies sometimes perform. This is to articulate to the government their views on matters of general policy, in addition to requesting subsidies for their specialized activities. Most of the general policy statements are, of course, simply echoes of the official line intended to ingratiate the group with the authorities. Occasionally, however, general demands are genuinely voiced. In early 1971, for example, the Cairo Regional Union of Societies focused upon the theme of women's rights at its annual conference.17 Its discussions and recommendations constituted a background of support for the efforts of the Minister of Social Affairs, a woman professor of law who came into office after the conference, to draft more progressive legislation concerning marriage and divorce-even though it was unlikely that she would succeed.18
As there is no distinct conceptual boundary between politics and charity, so there are no clear-cut institutional boundaries. Within the welfare-type category of societies supervised by the Ministry of Social Affairs are to be found-in addition to social assistance, rural migrant, and benevolent societies-associations of graduates of various specialized schools, the Commerce Club, and other organizations that might more logically be classified with the professional unions tied to the Arab Socialist Union, as well as obviously governmental groups such as the Sino-Arab Friendship Society and the Egyptian Society of Entomology, both of which seem neither political nor charitable. To confuse matters more, between 1955 and 1960 the trade unions were encouraged to form social welfare associations; but the latter were reintegrated into or totally separated from the unions 17 Women's rights are an especially appropriate cause, given the importance of women in the voluntary associations. In 1969 half the board members of the Cairo Regional Union were women. Women were members of one-third of Egypt's associations in 1960, and they constituted 9 percent of the total membership. Furthermore, the associations run by women seemed generally to be the most effective. Over half of those with substantial numbers of women produced more than $1200 worth of social services annually, compared to only 27 percent for all voluntary associations. See Ministry of Social Affairs, Survey of Societies and Social Organizations [in Arabic] (Cairo, n.d.), p. 125. 18 Sadat relied considerably on the symbols of orthodox Islam to develop legitimacy for himself and his government in the wake of Nasser's death. He could not afford to antagonize its principal spokesmen, the ulama, in the absence of a strongly organized counterconstituency. 203 higher authorities, some of whom had been eliminated by Sadat's purge. Membership in voluntary associations is often helpful to political careers in Egypt, whether at the provincial, local, or national level-so much so that one aspiring parliamentary candidate joined some thirty-eight of them, hoping his dues could buy useful contacts. There is, however, another, more public function that societies sometimes perform. This is to articulate to the government their views on matters of general policy, in addition to requesting subsidies for their specialized activities. Most of the general policy statements are, of course, simply echoes of the official line intended to ingratiate the group with the authorities. Occasionally, however, general demands are genuinely voiced. In early 1971, for example, the Cairo Regional Union of Societies focused upon the theme of women's rights at its annual conference.17 Its discussions and recommendations constituted a background of support for the efforts of the Minister of Social Affairs, a woman professor of law who came into office after the conference, to draft more progressive legislation concerning marriage and divorce-even though it was unlikely that she would succeed.18
As there is no distinct conceptual boundary between politics and charity, so there are no clear-cut institutional boundaries. Within the welfare-type category of societies supervised by the Ministry of Social Affairs are to be found-in addition to social assistance, rural migrant, and benevolent societies-associations of graduates of various specialized schools, the Commerce Club, and other organizations that might more logically be classified with the professional unions tied to the Arab Socialist Union, as well as obviously governmental groups such as the Sino-Arab Friendship Society and the Egyptian Society of Entomology, both of which seem neither political nor charitable. To confuse matters more, between 1955 and 1960 the trade unions were encouraged to form social welfare associations; but the latter were reintegrated into or totally separated from the unions 17 Women's rights are an especially appropriate cause, given the importance of women in the voluntary associations. In 1969 half the board members of the Cairo Regional Union were women. Women were members of one-third of Egypt's associations in 1960, and they constituted 9 percent of the total membership. Furthermore, the associations run by women seemed generally to be the most effective. Over half of those with substantial numbers of women produced more than $1200 worth of social services annually, compared to only 27 percent for all voluntary associations. Table 3 While there are no comparable published surveys taken after 1960 to indicate changes in the density of Cairo's network, the shreds of available evidence point to a decrease. In 1966 the government abolished some 1,300 societies, on the ground that they did not conform to the law of associations as amended in 1964. Most of these were of the "private" type, distributing funds only among their members. Since the bulk of Egypt's "private" societies had been concentrated in Cairo, the city was presumably hardest hit by the 1966 decision.25
Sheer quantity may sometimes be an indicator of quality; low longevity of associations inevitably suggests low density. Not only were many societies dissolved in 1966, but there is good reason to believe that a substantial proportion of Cairo's societies registered after 1945 were dissolved or abandoned by 1960.26 The implication is not that an overbearing government set out to atomize the society by destroying intermediary groups, but rather that such associations have a naturally high mortality rate and-since numbers are more or less constant over time-a correspondingly high birth rate. From the most recent Cairo data, it appears that the rate of turnover is as high or higher in the 1960s as in the 1950s.27 Hence associational density is unlikely to be increasing. While there are no comparable published surveys taken after 1960 to indicate changes in the density of Cairo's network, the shreds of available evidence point to a decrease. In 1966 the government abolished some 1,300 societies, on the ground that they did not conform to the law of associations as amended in 1964. Most of these were of the "private" type, distributing funds only among their members. Since the bulk of Egypt's "private" societies had been concentrated in Cairo, the city was presumably hardest hit by the 1966 decision.25
Sheer quantity may sometimes be an indicator of quality; low longevity of associations inevitably suggests low density. Not only were many societies dissolved in 1966, but there is good reason to believe that a substantial proportion of Cairo's societies registered after 1945 were dissolved or abandoned by 1960.26 The implication is not that an overbearing government set out to atomize the society by destroying intermediary groups, but rather that such associations have a naturally high mortality rate and-since numbers are more or less constant over time-a correspondingly high birth rate. From the most recent Cairo data, it appears that the rate of turnover is as high or higher in the 1960s as in the 1950s.27 Hence associational density is unlikely to be increasing. 25 Most of them were rural migrants' associations, grouping those who had come from a particular village or region, often simply for the purpose of assuring one another a decent burial. In 1960, 55 percent of the city's societies were classified as "private" whereas only 24 percent of societies outside Cairo were given this classification. Ibid., p. 71. 26 Some groups are accorded special legitimacy, however. Mainly in response to Syria's secession from the United Arab Republic in October 1961, Nasser discarded a traditional geographic basis of representation in his political organization, which he alleged had harbored "reactionaries" responsible for the breakup, in favor of a corporate representation of "popular forces." Table 4 summarizes the new formula and presents the most definitive official indication of the organized groups most relevant to Egyptian political life, apart from the official mass political organization, the Arab Socialist Union, which was never organized on a permanent basis for more than a year or two at a time.29
The sector with the most promising prospects for autonomy appears to be the modern professions, by virtue of their skills, technical expertise, and the government's need of them.30 More particularly, 29 The corporatist basis of representation was in a sense reaffirmed by the requirement from 1964 on that at least half of the membership of parliament and other political bodies be workers and peasants; the status of peasant, originally defined to include anyone owning up to twentyfive feddans, was subsequently restricted to owners of up to five feddans. Some groups are accorded special legitimacy, however. Mainly in response to Syria's secession from the United Arab Republic in October 1961, Nasser discarded a traditional geographic basis of representation in his political organization, which he alleged had harbored "reactionaries" responsible for the breakup, in favor of a corporate representation of "popular forces." Table 4 summarizes the new formula and presents the most definitive official indication of the organized groups most relevant to Egyptian political life, apart from the official mass political organization, the Arab Socialist Union, which was never organized on a permanent basis for more than a year or two at a time.29
The sector with the most promising prospects for autonomy appears to be the modern professions, by virtue of their skills, technical expertise, and the government's need of them.30 More particularly, 29 The corporatist basis of representation was in a sense reaffirmed by the requirement from 1964 on that at least half of the membership of parliament and other political bodies be workers and peasants; the status of peasant, originally defined to include anyone owning up to twentyfive feddans, was subsequently restricted to owners of up to five feddans. was demonstrated in other ways; for example, the syndicate's secondary leadership once organized a three-day strike of government engineers. Since the early 1950s, however, commitment has substantially declined, even as membership (which has always been compulsory), the prestige of the profession, and the influence of individual members have increased dramatically. Rarely before 1971 could the syndicate attract more than a few hundred of its 40,000 members to the annual meetings. Syndicate activities, other than administering a pension scheme, virtually ceased. Indeed, the syndicate, like those of other professions, barely survived Nasser's consolidation of power. First it was purged of political figures left over from the ancien regime, then brought under the control of army engineers. It barely managed to parry a recommendation to disaffiliate all civil servants-which in 1953 meant more than two-thirds of the engineers (and today virtually all of them). By mid-1955 a columnist of the Engineers' Magazine, the official organ of the syndicate, was advising his readers unconditionally to support "the revolutionaries," because "they usually have a good reason for everything they do."33
After 1958 all board members of the syndicate were required to be members of the National Union (and subsequently the Arab Socialist Union).Even so, the syndicate's elections were postponed and its activity virtually frozen in the early 1960s, while Nasser considered converting the professional syndicates into learned societies under the supervision of the Ministry of Social Affairs. Since 1965 pressure has been exerted on the engineers to admit certain categories of skilled workers into their syndicate lest it be abolished altogether.
Though publicized as a "socialist beehive" and "the technical committee of the Arab Socialist Union" during the late 1960s, when it was controlled by Ali Sabry's organization, the syndicate does not appear to have been able to marshal the necessary time or expertise from its members to provide any technical advice. Most technical discussions occurred next door at the Engineers' Society, run by a somewhat different, more academic group of engineers. The society's quarterly journal, in addition, tended to be of a higher technical standard than the syndicate's magazine. It is true that engineers connected with the syndicate did not hesitate in some of the columns of the Engineers' Magazine to lash out at government policies, criticizing many relatively important political rather than technical decisions, as well as the functioning of particular government depart-33 Magallat al-Muhandisin (Engineers' Magazine, hereafter referred to as MM), July 1955, p. 13.
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Nasser was able to control the engineers and other groups so easily. It is claimed that he controlled the Arab Socialist Union, and through it the various syndicates, by means of a "secret apparatus" of perhaps 1,000 loyal individuals who served as a sort of political police reporting directly to one of his security advisers. The apparatus itself seems to have had little cohesion or ideological consistency, however. Within months of taking office, President Sadat locked up its leaders, and the apparatus simply disintegrated. Erstwhile apparatchiks scrambled as quickly as possible to join the new leadership, in order not to lose their jobs.36
Such behavior is of course endemic to authoritarian systems in that by definition they lack strong vanguard parties. However, the case of the engineers further suggests that the regime had no need of an organizational juggernaut to keep various groups undetr control. Organized groupings in Egypt were readily amenable to manipulation from above. They lacked the resources-especially the commitment of their members-that might have encouraged them to seek autonomy. Thus, the totalitarian model was never applicable. The regime did not need to atomize social groupings because it did not confront groups with a strong corporate tradition of their own.
People's Channels Egyptian political action is not carried out primarily through organized groups; rather, Egyptians constantly seek to consolidate and maintain their personal alliance systems-very much in the manner of the Moroccan political elites described by John M. Waterbury.37 Organized groups are only one vehicle for alliance-building, and certainly a less important one than family, personal friendships, and the variety of face-to-face groupings of an informal yet somewhat structured nature that seem to abound in Egyptian society. An example of the latter is the "Sunday Club" of young engineer professors, trained for the most part in the United States, who used to meet once a week for recreation. Within any more organized group, moreover, various subgroups are usually competing for members' loyalties, thereby attenuating loyalties to the wider group if not altogether paralyzing it. Any abstract classification can make a group, but there 36 Officers of the Engineers' Syndicate seem to have been purged more than those of most syndicates. Twenty-two of the thirty-one-man council were casualties of the May 13 coup, compared to four of seventeen lawyers and eighteen of thirty-eight agronomists. The extent of the purge is probably proportional to the influence of the syndicate. 
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At no level of community, however, do organizations acquire a high degree of institutionalization. The weakness of the engineers, or indeed of any categoric group in Egyptian society, in a sense reflects that of the political infrastructure. The Liberation Rally, the National Union, and the Arab Socialist Union never became institutions, for Nasser was constantly restructuring his political organization and reshuffling its leadership. The ASU, for instance, underwent a major reorganization in 1968, only three years after the original, lengthy process of establishing it. Until 1968 all its leadership seems to have been appointed rather than elected-the Supreme Executive Committee (itself altered in 1964 and again in 1966), the "Provisional" Secretariat, and even the executive bureaus at the governorate, district, city, and village levels-while the Central Committee, which was supposed to elect the Supreme Executive, never came into being. are so many from which to choose that only rarely will the individual consider himself a member of any particular one, at least to the point of really dedicating himself to its organization.
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Political culture is better seen as an historical tradition, at least in countries that have a history, than as a set of mutually correlated responses to survey questionnaires. In a previous article I tried to point out aspects of the Arab-Islamic tradition that impeded the emergence of practical ideology, the necessary concomitant of organizational weapons, in the contemporary Arab world.40 Crucial to the analysis was the fact that the Islamic world did not organize a formal church and hence did not offer either ideological or organizational conditions for a Western-type reformation. Islam presented no target against which a militant revolutionary group might organize while assimilating its organizational skills, as did Puritans, Jacobins, and eventually Bolsheviks, in the Christian world. The only target came much later in the form of the Western colonial presence. In Egypt, as in most of the Arab East, the target was more veiled, ambiguous, and of shorter duration as a political-administrative presence than in French North Africa. No dialectical transformation of the political culture was possible as in at least one of the French possessions. Existing structures, notably the state bureaucracy, were patched up in Egypt, not displaced or even substantially reformed by the British.
Indeed, the striking continuity and size of the Egyptian state also differentiates it from that of most authoritarian systems. Unlike its Arab neighbors, Egypt has always been a peasant society offering a rich tax base for a strong state which in turn, by controlling the Nile, made a continuous peasant society possible. The modernization of agriculture was undertaken some half century before Britain occupied Egypt in 1882. The British presence may have accelerated, but it did not fundamentally change, the course of transformations already underway. 41 The most significant were the improvement of public works, especially irrigation and drainage, the consolidation of public finances, and the emergence of large autonomous landed interests. Only the latter, eventually cut down by Nasser, threatened to undermine the traditional autonomy of the Egyptian state. Under the British the development of administrative infrastructure outran that of political infrastructure. In this sense Nasser merely continued-or science, business, administration, and politics-is the outcome of the effect of the interaction and discussions among the members of these groupings. The progress of nations is dependent upon the progress of these groupings and on their shared social activities. Those that have not the fortune to create groups, meaning societies, political parties conferences, cooperatives, and trade unions, have no share in the civilization of this age. No matter how large their number may be and no matter how strong the social ties that bind them, they are not to be considered as belonging to the nations or peoples of this era. On the contrary, they are no more than serfs and slaves to the social nations.43
In answer to Rida, however, Egypt has many active groupings-societies, conferences, cooperatives, and trade unions, if not political parties. Their advice is often taken into account, but without accountability, on specific matters, at least. Meanwhile, modernization may depend less on the nature of the regime than on the availability of foreign exchange-hence relations with the "social nations." There is no participation crisis for the huge majority, even among the middle and upper educated classes, but only the personal frustration, relieved by sardonic humor and occasional fits of institution-building, that has always accompanied the prevailing style. The regime displays a tremendous elasticity in its ability to absorb new groups in plastic structures, control them, and satisfy an occasional demand without sacrificing resources needed to satisfy other groups and proceed with ambitious investment programs.
Conclusion
Egypt's fund of political experience is older and perhaps no less profound than pluralist theory; certainly even contemporary Egypt sheds serious doubt on the assumed need of modernizing societies for either strong autonomous groups or an organizational juggernaut. As a modally significant case, Nasser's Egypt also sheds more general light on authoritarian politics in modernizing societies by suggesting basic differences between those of corporate and unincorporated societies. This raises some hypotheses worthy of future comparative research.
Occasional breaks in the regimes of unincorporated societies are to be expected, since they do not rest on the strongly organized support of either pluralist or totalitarian regimes. Support is even less reliable than in the authoritarian regimes of corporate societies because the latter, out of weakness, must bargain with legitimate corporate 43 
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Occasional breaks in the regimes of unincorporated societies are to be expected, since they do not rest on the strongly organized support of either pluralist or totalitarian regimes. Support is even less reliable than in the authoritarian regimes of corporate societies because the latter, out of weakness, must bargain with legitimate corporate 43 groups rather than simply withdraw their legitimacy. On the other hand, the experience of Nasser's Egypt suggests that power, once conquered, is more easily consolidated and expanded in the unincorporated kind of society.
Such systems remain prone to coups, in other words, even as modernization proceeds, but they seem less vulnerable to revolution than do authoritarian regimes in corporate societies. As a concluding irony, however, the cultural syndrome that supports unincorporated society is unlikely to change without revolution. groups rather than simply withdraw their legitimacy. On the other hand, the experience of Nasser's Egypt suggests that power, once conquered, is more easily consolidated and expanded in the unincorporated kind of society.
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